Loading workspace insights... Statistics interval
7 days30 daysLatest CI Pipeline Executions
cbfefc04 chore(deps): update dependency qs to v6.14.2 [security] (main) (#3985)
This PR contains the following updates:
| Package | Change |
[Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
[Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
|---|---|---|---|
| [qs](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs) | [`6.14.1` ā
`6.14.2`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/qs/6.14.1/6.14.2) |
|
|
### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
####
[CVE-2026-2391](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/security/advisories/GHSA-w7fw-mjwx-w883)
### Summary
The `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for
comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers
to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of
the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass
addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).
### Details
When the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but
configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings
as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `['a', 'b', 'c']`). However, the
limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional
throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in
`parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of
arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive
memory allocation.
**Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
return val.split(',');
}
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}
return val;
```
The `split(',')` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent
limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent
allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This
discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of
commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory
without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which
is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`)
notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).
### PoC
**Test 1 - Basic bypass:**
```
npm install qs
```
```js
const qs = require('qs');
const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)
const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };
try {
const result = qs.parse(payload, options);
console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)
} catch (e) {
console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message); // Not thrown
}
```
**Configuration:**
- `comma: true`
- `arrayLimit: 5`
- `throwOnLimitExceeded: true`
Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error.
Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.
### Impact
Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.
### Suggested Fix
Move the `arrayLimit` check before the comma split in `parseArrayValue`,
and enforce it on the resulting array length. Use `currentArrayLength`
(already calculated upstream) for consistency with bracket notation
fixes.
**Current code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
return val.split(',');
}
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}
return val;
```
**Fixed code:**
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
const splitArray = val.split(',');
if (splitArray.length > options.arrayLimit - currentArrayLength) { // Check against remaining limit
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
} else {
// Optionally convert to object or truncate, per README
return splitArray.slice(0, options.arrayLimit - currentArrayLength);
}
}
return splitArray;
}
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}
return val;
```
This aligns behavior with indexed and bracket notations, reuses
`currentArrayLength`, and respects `throwOnLimitExceeded`. Update README
to note the consistent enforcement.
---
### Release Notes
<details>
<summary>ljharb/qs (qs)</summary>
###
[`v6.14.2`](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#6142)
[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/compare/v6.14.1...v6.14.2)
- \[Fix] `parse`: mark overflow objects for indexed notation exceeding
`arrayLimit`
([#​546](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/issues/546))
- \[Fix] `arrayLimit` means max count, not max index, in
`combine`/`merge`/`parseArrayValue`
- \[Fix] `parse`: throw on `arrayLimit` exceeded with indexed notation
when `throwOnLimitExceeded` is true
([#​529](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/issues/529))
- \[Fix] `parse`: enforce `arrayLimit` on `comma`-parsed values
- \[Fix] `parse`: fix error message to reflect arrayLimit as max index;
remove extraneous comments
([#​545](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/issues/545))
- \[Robustness] avoid `.push`, use `void`
- \[readme] document that `addQueryPrefix` does not add `?` to empty
output ([#​418](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/issues/418))
- \[readme] clarify `parseArrays` and `arrayLimit` documentation
([#​543](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/issues/543))
- \[readme] replace runkit CI badge with shields.io check-runs badge
- \[meta] fix changelog typo (`arrayLength` ā `arrayLimit`)
- \[actions] fix rebase workflow permissions
</details>
---
### Configuration
š
**Schedule**: Branch creation - "" in timezone Europe/Paris, Automerge
- At any time (no schedule defined).
š¦ **Automerge**: Disabled because a matching PR was automerged
previously.
ā» **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the
rebase/retry checkbox.
š **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update
again.
---
- [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check
this box
---
This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
View the [repository job
log](https://developer.mend.io/github/AmadeusITGroup/otter).
<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4yMi4wIiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiNDMuMjIuMCIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6Im1haW4iLCJsYWJlbHMiOlsiZGVwZW5kZW5jaWVzIl19--> cbfefc04 chore(deps): update dependency qs to v6.14.2 [security] (main) (#3985)
This PR contains the following updates:
| Package | Change |
[Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
[Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
|---|---|---|---|
| [qs](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs) | [`6.14.1` ā
`6.14.2`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/qs/6.14.1/6.14.2) |
|
|
### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
####
[CVE-2026-2391](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/security/advisories/GHSA-w7fw-mjwx-w883)
### Summary
The `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for
comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers
to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of
the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass
addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).
### Details
When the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but
configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings
as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `['a', 'b', 'c']`). However, the
limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional
throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in
`parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of
arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive
memory allocation.
**Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
return val.split(',');
}
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}
return val;
```
The `split(',')` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent
limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent
allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This
discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of
commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory
without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which
is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`)
notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).
### PoC
**Test 1 - Basic bypass:**
```
npm install qs
```
```js
const qs = require('qs');
const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)
const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };
try {
const result = qs.parse(payload, options);
console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)
} catch (e) {
console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message); // Not thrown
}
```
**Configuration:**
- `comma: true`
- `arrayLimit: 5`
- `throwOnLimitExceeded: true`
Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error.
Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.
### Impact
Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.
### Suggested Fix
Move the `arrayLimit` check before the comma split in `parseArrayValue`,
and enforce it on the resulting array length. Use `currentArrayLength`
(already calculated upstream) for consistency with bracket notation
fixes.
**Current code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
return val.split(',');
}
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}
return val;
```
**Fixed code:**
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
const splitArray = val.split(',');
if (splitArray.length > options.arrayLimit - currentArrayLength) { // Check against remaining limit
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
} else {
// Optionally convert to object or truncate, per README
return splitArray.slice(0, options.arrayLimit - currentArrayLength);
}
}
return splitArray;
}
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}
return val;
```
This aligns behavior with indexed and bracket notations, reuses
`currentArrayLength`, and respects `throwOnLimitExceeded`. Update README
to note the consistent enforcement.
---
### Release Notes
<details>
<summary>ljharb/qs (qs)</summary>
###
[`v6.14.2`](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#6142)
[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/compare/v6.14.1...v6.14.2)
- \[Fix] `parse`: mark overflow objects for indexed notation exceeding
`arrayLimit`
([#​546](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/issues/546))
- \[Fix] `arrayLimit` means max count, not max index, in
`combine`/`merge`/`parseArrayValue`
- \[Fix] `parse`: throw on `arrayLimit` exceeded with indexed notation
when `throwOnLimitExceeded` is true
([#​529](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/issues/529))
- \[Fix] `parse`: enforce `arrayLimit` on `comma`-parsed values
- \[Fix] `parse`: fix error message to reflect arrayLimit as max index;
remove extraneous comments
([#​545](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/issues/545))
- \[Robustness] avoid `.push`, use `void`
- \[readme] document that `addQueryPrefix` does not add `?` to empty
output ([#​418](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/issues/418))
- \[readme] clarify `parseArrays` and `arrayLimit` documentation
([#​543](https://redirect.github.com/ljharb/qs/issues/543))
- \[readme] replace runkit CI badge with shields.io check-runs badge
- \[meta] fix changelog typo (`arrayLength` ā `arrayLimit`)
- \[actions] fix rebase workflow permissions
</details>
---
### Configuration
š
**Schedule**: Branch creation - "" in timezone Europe/Paris, Automerge
- At any time (no schedule defined).
š¦ **Automerge**: Disabled because a matching PR was automerged
previously.
ā» **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the
rebase/retry checkbox.
š **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update
again.
---
- [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check
this box
---
This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
View the [repository job
log](https://developer.mend.io/github/AmadeusITGroup/otter).
<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4yMi4wIiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiNDMuMjIuMCIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6Im1haW4iLCJsYWJlbHMiOlsiZGVwZW5kZW5jaWVzIl19-->