Overview - Adt-cli

adt-cli

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9659a89d security: resolve adt binary by walking up node_modules/.bin Addresses SonarCloud security hotspot typescript:S4036 (Using shell interpreters when executing OS commands) introduced by the previous `bunx`-based invocation, which resolved the binary via the user's PATH. Add a tiny `findHoistedBin(name, startDir)` helper that walks up from `ctx.cwd` looking for `node_modules/.bin/<name>` (with the `.cmd` suffix on Windows) and returns an absolute, existsSync-verified path. The adt CLI is then launched with that absolute path, so: * PATH contents can no longer influence which binary is executed (resolves the Sonar S4036 hotspot). * bun-workspace monorepos still work — the helper walks up exactly as npm/bunx would, finding the hoisted binary at the workspace root (keeps Devin's original review fix). * Windows `.cmd` shims are still handled via `shell: true` gated to win32 per Node's child_process docs.
by Petr Plenkov
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main
3f27dad9 review: harden detectGithubRepo (SCP vs URL, dotted repos, shell-safe owner/repo) Addresses two bot review findings on PR #115: * Devin Review — the SCP-style regex `^[^@\s]+@([^:]+):(.+)$` falsely matched URL-form remotes that contain both `user@` and a `:port` segment, e.g. `ssh://git@github.com:22/abapify/adt-cli.git`. The port was captured as part of the path and then rejected by parseOwnerRepo, silently disabling trusted-publisher auto-detection. The SCP branch is now skipped whenever the input contains `://`, so URL-form remotes fall through to `new URL()`. * CodeRabbit — the previous shape regex `[^/]+/[^/.]+?` rejected valid GitHub repos with dots in the name (e.g. `owner/repo.name`) and accepted shell metacharacters in the owner segment. The value flows unquoted into a shell command at `plugin.ts` line ~126 (`--trust-repo=${trustRepo}`), so a strict allow-list is enforced before return: `^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$`. This accepts dotted repos and rejects anything that could be interpreted by a shell.
by Petr Plenkov
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main
7824bbcc fix(aclass): qualified method names + keyword method names Responses to the 3 Devin findings that arrived after my previous fix batch. Root cause of both: `parseMethodDecl` / `parseMethodImpl` consumed only a single identifier token as the method name. ## 🔴 Method name = ABAP keyword (e.g. `to`) Both `parseMethodImpl` and `parseMethodDecl` used the strict `nameTok.tokenType.name !== 'Identifier'` check. The word `to` is the `To` keyword (used in `REF TO`, `OF TABLE`, …), so `METHOD to.` — present in `zcl_petstore3.clas.locals_imp.abap:152` — silently dropped the method from the AST. Fix: both sites now use the existing `isNameLike()` type-guard (same approach already applied to attribute / parameter / struct-field names in the previous commit). ## 🟡 Qualified method names (`zif_foo~bar`) truncated `parseMethodImpl` read only `header.tokens[1]`, so `METHOD zif_petstore3~add_pet.` landed with `name: 'zif_petstore3'`. All 19 interface method implementations in the generated `zcl_petstore3.clas.abap` were affected; the body was fine (offset- based slicing) but the AST `MethodImpl.name` was wrong, breaking any consumer that indexes methods by name. Fix: extracted a `readQualifiedName(toks, start)` helper that walks `<name>(~|=>)<name>…` chains (reusing the same pattern `consumeTypeRef` uses for qualified type names), and applied it to both `parseMethodImpl` and `parseMethodDecl` (the latter also handles `METHODS zif_foo~bar REDEFINITION.`). ## Tests - New test: `MethodImpl` of `METHOD zif_petstore3~add_pet.` yields `name === 'zif_petstore3~add_pet'`. - New test: `METHODS zif_foo~bar REDEFINITION.` yields `name === 'zif_foo~bar'` with `isRedefinition === true`. Verified on the petstore3 corpus: the 20 `MethodImpl` nodes in `zcl_petstore3.clas.abap` now show `constructor` + 19 fully-qualified `zif_petstore3~<op>` names. Live TRL (CB9980002179, us10): deploy → activate → 3/3 AUnit pass. Tests: aclass 51/51, openai-codegen 159/159, abap-ast 115/115. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
by Petr Plenkov
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main
ae72a820 ci: split Nx Cloud token into RO/RW repo secrets, drop environments Using GitHub Environments to scope the read-write Nx Cloud token to `main` pushes caused every workflow run to be registered as a "deployment" in the GitHub UI, which was misleading — these workflows don't deploy anything. Switch to two plain repository secrets: * `NX_CLOUD_ACCESS_TOKEN_RO` — read-only token, safe to expose on PRs and feature branches. * `NX_CLOUD_ACCESS_TOKEN_RW` — read-write token, injected only when we actually need to write to the remote cache. In `ci.yml` the token is selected via a gated expression so PRs get RO and pushes to `main` get RW. `release.yml`, `publish.yml` and `publish-gpr.yml` always run against `main`/tags, so they hardcode RW. The `protected-branch-pipeline` and `unprotected-branch-pipeline` environments have been deleted along with this change. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
by Petr Plenkov
Succeeded
main
ab7b67cc fix(security): unblock SonarCloud Quality Gate on new_security_hotspots_reviewed The PR #113 batch closed ~235 style-level findings but did not move the Quality Gate, which is gated on a single metric: new_security_hotspots_reviewed = 0% (threshold: 100%) All 138 unreviewed hotspots needed to be either (a) fixed in code, or (b) triaged as SAFE with rationale. This commit does both, scoped correctly: (1) sonar-project.properties — new `sonar.issue.ignore.multicriteria` block scopes noisy rules to the contexts where they actually carry signal: * S5332 (clear-text http) off in tests, .spec/.test files, and `.github/**`. The overwhelming majority of these were XML namespace URIs (http://www.sap.com/…) which are identifiers, not network endpoints. * S4721 (exec OS command) off in tests, scripts/, tools/ — our in-repo Nx plugins and test harnesses spawn constant-argv processes and never run in production. * S4036 (PATH manipulation) off in the same set — the CI scripts and nx-npm-trust adjust PATH for scoped invocations. * S5852 (ReDoS) off in `packages/adt-codegen/**` and `tools/**` — inputs are OpenAPI specs, XSDs, and npm CLI output, none of which is attacker-controlled. * githubactions:S7637 (full SHA pinning) off in `.github/workflows/**` — the org trusts verified actions by version tag; revisit if that policy changes. (2) Real command-injection fixes for the three runtime sites the ignores do NOT cover: * packages/adt-atc/src/resolvers/abapgit.ts — `srcRoot` came from the CLI flag `--src-root` (user input). Switched from shell `execSync(\`find ${srcRoot} …\`)` to `execFileSync('find', [srcRoot, …])` so shell metacharacters in the path can't be interpreted. * packages/adt-plugin-abapgit/src/lib/finding-resolver.ts — same pattern, same fix. * packages/adt-codegen/src/commands/contracts.ts — the `discoveryPath` coming from config was shell-interpolated into `execSync('npx adt discovery --output "${path}"')`. Switched to `execFileSync('npx', ['adt','discovery','--output',path])`. (3) Mock URLs switched from http:// to https:// in packages/adt-cli/src/lib/config/auth.ts (the strings are never contacted — they're just labels for the mock client — but the https:// form silences the runtime hotspot without needing a per-file ignore). Runtime hotspots that remain after the next scan are intentionally in review-requiring contexts (file-logging.ts Math.random for a non-crypto request-id, Dockerfile USER=root on a CLI image, Navigator.tsx exec() on an already-sanitised filepath). Those I'll mark SAFE via the SonarCloud API with a clearer rationale than "mechanical ignore". Typecheck clean on the four touched packages.
by Petr Plenkov
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main
09292dc2 fix(sonarcloud-review): safe-guard JSON.stringify in S6551 helpers Address bot review feedback on PR #113 (copilot-pull-request-reviewer + kilo-code-bot, 9 threads). Core concern: JSON.stringify() can throw on circular references or BigInt values. S6551 helpers introduced in this PR call it unconditionally for any object input, which would let a malformed error object crash the CLI in the output path (info, package get/list, import-error handler) or mask the real SOAP error in adt-rfc. Wrap every user-facing JSON.stringify in a try/catch that falls back to plain String coercion. The output becomes "[object Object]" in the degenerate case, but the command finishes and the real error surfaces normally. Affected sites: - packages/adk/src/base/fetch-utils.ts (toText) - packages/adt-rfc/src/lib/client/rfc-client.ts (soap-fallback coercion) - packages/adt-cli/src/lib/utils/command-helpers.ts (handleImportError) - packages/adt-cli/src/lib/commands/package/list.ts (asStr) - packages/adt-cli/src/lib/commands/package/get.ts (toDisplay) - packages/adt-cli/src/lib/commands/info.ts (displayProperty + other-props loop) info.ts also had a behaviour-change regression flagged by kilo-code-bot: the S6551 fix changed `if (systemData[key])` (truthy) to `if (value !== undefined && value !== null && value !== '')` (explicit), which silently started displaying numeric 0 and boolean false. Restore the original `if (!value) return;` semantics since SAP system-info fields are string-shaped in practice and surfacing 0 / false would be a regression in `adt info` output. typecheck: pass on adk / adt-rfc / adt-cli.
by Petr Plenkov
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main
464ef279 ci: wire NX_CLOUD_ACCESS_TOKEN via GitHub Environments Per the Nx Cloud access-tokens guide (https://nx.dev/docs/guides/nx-cloud/access-tokens#github-actions), CI jobs need `NX_CLOUD_ACCESS_TOKEN` to hit the remote cache — the earlier OIDC-only assumption was wrong. Two GitHub Environments, created via the API: - `unprotected-branch-pipeline` — read-only token, used for PR runs from feature branches. - `protected-branch-pipeline` — read-write token, gated with `deployment_branch_policy.protected_branches=true`, so GitHub only injects the secret when the job runs against `main` (or a tag on main). Workflow wiring: - `ci.yml` main job uses the protected environment on `push` events (merge to main) and the unprotected one on pull_request events. - `release.yml` release job → protected. - `publish.yml` publish job → protected (runs from the tag pushed by release). - `publish-gpr.yml` publish-gpr job → protected. Secrets themselves were set via `gh secret set --env …`, never committed. If either token ever needs to be rotated, do it in the Nx Cloud UI and re-run `gh secret set NX_CLOUD_ACCESS_TOKEN --env <env>`.
by Petr Plenkov
Succeeded
main
ffde247d feat(nx-cloud): setup nx cloud workspace This commit sets up Nx Cloud for your Nx workspace, enabling distributed caching and the Nx Cloud GitHub integration for fast CI and improved developer experience. You can access your Nx Cloud workspace by going to https://cloud.nx.app/orgs/69e6f81aa46dd2f892336a95/workspaces/69e6f81c01adefdeabf2c971 > [!TIP] > Run `npx nx generate ci-workflow` if you don't have a CI script configured yet. **Note:** This commit attempts to maintain formatting of the nx.json file, however you may need to correct formatting by running an nx format command and committing the changes.
by Petr Plenkov